EVIDENCE OF THREATS.
took lands for permanent use under
the Improvement Acts of 1825, 826,
1827 and 1828, and similar acts, and
constructed and operated a canal
upon it, she acquired an estate in
such land in perpetuity, and may
dispose of the same in fee.
When land is procured for the
building of a canal thereon the
piesumption is that the right of soil
is acquired, and not a mere easement. The Commonwealth sold
the canal to a corporation: Held,
that the fee in the land occupied by
the canal was in the Commonwealth
and passed to the corporation, and
that the former owner had no title
to it norto the coal underthe canal:
Wyoming Co. v. Price, 81 Pa., x56;
Robinson v. R. R. Co., 22 P. F. S.,
316; Union Canal Co. v. Young,
i Whart., 4IO Malone v. City of
Toledo, 34 Ohio, 541.
Where a corporation is authorized to acquire land in fee, either
by legal proceedings or purchase,

the property so acquired may, by
authority of the legislature, be devoted to a new and different public
use, after the use for which it was
originally acquired has been terminated; or the land may be aliened
by the corporation. In such cases
no right of property of any individhal is violated. The original owner
has no reversionary or other interest in the land: Heard v. City of
Brooklyn, 6o N. Y., 242.
Wherever the Commonwealth, in
the construction of her public works,
acquires a fee simple in lands taken
therefor, and land is devoted to
that use, a cessation of that use
would not revest the title in the
former owner: Haldeman v. Penna.
Cen. R. R. Co., So Pa., 425. See,
alpo, Rexford v. Knight, ii N. Y.,
3o8; Pittsburgh & LT. B. R. R. -).
Bruce, 102 Pa., 23; Heywood v.
Mayor, 7 N. Y., 314.
WILLIAm A. DAVIS.

DEPARTMENT OF PRACTICE, PLEADING AND
EVIDENCE.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF.
HON.

GEORGE M. DALLAS.
Assisted by

ARDEMUS STEWART,

STATE v. KENYON.'

HENRY N. SMALTZ,

JoaN A. DICcARTHY.

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.

Evidence-Homicide-Threats.
Upon the trial of an indictment for homicide it appeared that the
defendant, some time after a personal encounter with the deceased, had
taken his position, rifle in hand, where he could see his victim but could
I Reported in 26 Ail. Rep., 199.
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not be seen by him. As the latter approached, the defendant fired at him
twice, the second shot inflicting a mortal wound. The deceased was
unarmed. Held, that it was not error to exclude evidence of threatd
previously made by the deceased to the effect that he intended to kill the
* defendant, since there was no evidence that the deceased made any
attack upon the defendant, or that the latter was in any imminent
danger.

Opinion by STiNESS, J.
BvhBNcZ Or THR.ZATS nq HoMicmE CASES.
.'Can evidence," asks WHARTON
_(Crim. Uvid., 9th ed.,
7S7), "to
the effect that the deceased, prior
to a homicide, threatened the de* fendant's life, be received; and if
so, is it a prerequisite to the proof
of such threats that they should be
. shown to have been communicated
to 'the defendant?"
The learned
author proceeds to answer the question, briefly referring to the many
cases in which the point has come
up for decision. It should seem to
'be.worth while to examine these
cases, and others, at greater length
and to attempt a careful' classification of them.
I The' question may present itself
in three possible ways: (I) A
threatens B's life. B -hears of it
and kills A by way of precaution.
Is evidence of the threats admissible by way of justification? (2) A
threatens B's life. B hears of it,
anti in a subsequent personal encdunte A .is
killed. The question
is, which was the aggressor? Is evidence of the threats admissible as
tending to prove thatA was? (3)
Vary the facts of (2) by supposing
B to have been ignorant of the
making of the threats. Is evidence
of them admissible?
(3) Evidence of threats against
defendant aslustificationfor homicide. The questions arising under
this head have been treated bytext
writers and courts alike as questions in the law of evidence. The
*

writer is unable to understand what
ground there is for such treatment.
The question here raised is, it is
submitted, not a question of remedial,but of substaiztive law: it is to
be settled by a reference not to the
law of evidence, but to the principles of criminal law. Is it a justification for homicide that the deceased threatened the life of the
defendant? If it is, of course evidence-of the fact that threats were
made may be given. If it is not,
then the evidence will be excluded,
not because of any technical. rule
of evidence, but because the substantive law declares that the existence or non-existence of the fact
sought to be proved has no bearing whatever on the rights of the
parties.
Thus in the principal case, while
the learned Judge obviously has in
mind the appropriate principles
upon which the decision should be
based, he yet thinks it proper to
discuss the pioblem before him
under the form of a question of
evidence. He might have said:
"The undisputed evidence shows
that there was no personal encounter and that; on the defendant's own showing, the shooting
was done by way of precaution.
Such proceeding is without legal
justification. All the threats in the
world will not alter- the. aspect of
the defendant's act." What he did
say was, "taking the defendant's
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own statement, notwithstanding its
contradiction by other testimony,
as the basis for the evidence offered,
it was clarly inadmissible." As
above stated, it is clear from many
passages that the learned Judge had
the reason for the exclusion clearly
in mind, as witness the following:
"Under such circumstances, evidence of previous threats was
plainly irrelevant, for they could
not justify the use of the deadly
weapon." It is only to be regretted that he did not avoid every appearance of deciding upon the
basis of the law of evidence.
In the judgment of the writer
the treatment of a similar question by RvLAND, J., in State v.
Hays, 23 Mo., 287 (1856), is to
"Upon such a
be preferred:
transaction as this, what good to
the prisoner would. proof of previous threats against him by the
deceased have produced? Could
they have changed the facts? Could
they have altered the routine of
events in their melancholy detail?
Or would such threats have altered
Why,
the law? Surely not .....
then, offer this evidence of a loose
threat, without any date? It was
a mere after-thought, got up to dis-ract the jury with a collateral
matter utterlyforeign to the issue
on trial, and was properly rejected."
It is, of course, clear that where,
as a matter of substantive law,
threats constitute a justification or
amountto a mitigating circumstance, they may be proved. Thus
in Meade's case (i Lewin's C. C.,
x84; Roscoe's Crim. Ev., 772, 5th
ed.), Meade's life and property
had been threatened the day befofe
the killing by a company of persons of whom the deceased was one.
Meade, under an apprehension, as

he alleged, that his life and property were in actual and immediate
danger, fired a pistol with deadly
effect. Evidence of the threats was
admitted, HOTROXD, J., saying to
the jury: "If you are of opinion
that Meade was really attacked,
and that Law and his party were on
the point of breaking into the
house, or likely to do so, and execute the threat of the day before,
he was, perhaps,justified in firing
as he did." A similar principle underlies the decision in State v.
Keene, 50 Mo., 358 (1872). With
these cases may be compared Rector's case, 19 Wend., 569 (1838).
In that case the facts are somewhat
similar to Meade's case (supra),
except that the threats had been
made a week before the killing,
and the assailants Were not positively identified with the previous
rioters. COWEN, J., speaking for
the majority, thought the evidence
was admissible, it being a question
for the jury whether "the resistance
offered was out of hroortion to the
injury which there was reasonable
causefor aprehending." (p. 59o).
BRONSON, J., dissented, thinking
that it was competent for the Court
to declare, as a matter of law, that
threats made under the circumstances of this case constituted no
justification. The Chief Justice
(NELSON), while doubting if the
fact of such threats would exert
any influence on the minds of the
jury, hesitated to adopt the view of
the trial judge and of BRONSON, J.,
and concurred in ordering a new
trial.
(2) Evidence of threats communicatedto defendant ofieredloproze
that the deceased was the assailant.
If the criminal law of any jurisdiction accepts the plea of self-defnce
as a justification for murder,
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whether evidence offered by the- had been actually present. See
State v. Gibson (Ala.), 9 S., I;
defendant does or does, not support
State v. Turner, . S. . Rep., 723;
that plea is never decided by any
Watson v. Comm., 87 Va., 6o8; 13
rule of evidence. The substantive
S. E. Rep., 22; Comm. v. Barners
law defines what is a justification
for murder and all evidence pro- (Ky.), i6 S. E. Rep., 457.
Evidence of threats made by the
bative of that justification is admisare never admissible in
deceased
sible.
It has been seen that B can never justification, where in the transacjustify the murder of A upon the tion which results in the victim's
murder there has not been some
ground&that the latter threatened
overt act or demonstration suffi.
Comm.
the former's life: Smith v.
(Ky.), 4 S. W., 798; State v. Mc- ciently.aggressive tb impress the
Cahift tIowa), 33 N. W., 599;"Phil- defendant that the victim was about
v.
lips v. State (Tex.), 2 S. W., 6oi; to execute such threats. State
Wat48r;
Rep.,
S.
E.
14
Howard,
W.,
14.
4
S.
(Mo.),
State v. Partlow
son v. Comm., 87 Va., 6o8; 13 S. E.
Evidence, therefore, ofthreats made
Rep., 22r; Gibson v. State, 91 Ala.,
by the deceased are very properly
64; Gonzales v. State (Tex.), 12 S.
rejected.
W., 733; Bernard v. State, 88 Tenfi.,
But if there has been any demon183; 28 Tex. App., i3q; Price v.
stration on the part of the deceased
at the time the mortal blow is People, 131 Ill.,223. If it is
affirmatively showzn that the degiven this fact, when coupled with
fendant fired the first shot, and the
the fact of defendant's knowledge
of the threats, may render the con-, demonstration of the deceased
occurred'after the event, evidence
duct of the defendant justifiable,
of previously made threats is inthough were no threats uttered, it
admissible. State v. Brooks, 2 S.
would -notbe So.
Rep., 198.
In State v. Jackson, 32 S. C., 42,
It is thus seen that in discussing
the'deceased meeting the defendant admissibility of threats made
the
of
a
movement
upon a road made
by the deceased in justification of
his hand toward his hip pocket.
The defendant, who had heard of his acts we are simply dealing with
murderous threats made by the de- a principle of criminal law, nt a
rule of evidence.
ceitsed, thought, erroneously, that
The character of the demonstrathe diceased was about to draw a
of the deceased upon entions
It
threat.
the
execute
to
revolver
countering the defendant must imwas held that evidence of the
press the fatter with a sense of
threats was admissible to prove
that the defendant's impression as danger. The danger need not be
real, but it miust be apparently
to the reality of his danger was
"imminent, urgent and pressing."
justifiable, taking into considera223; GilPrice v. People, 131 Ill.,
tion -his knowledge of the animins
more v. People, 124 III., 38o;
of the deceased toward him.
330;
If, under the circumstances of Hughes v. People, i16 Ill.,
Campbell v. Comm. (Ky.), I6 S.
the above case, there had been no
W. Rep., 127.
threats made by the deceased, the
In Smith v. Florida, 25 Fla., 517,
killing certainly would not have
the deceased and defendant met on
been justifiable, unless the danger
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a public road. The defendant fired
and killed, alleging in justification
that the deceased had threatened to
take. defendant's life upon meeting
him. The evidence showed that
deceased was unarmed at the time;
that he did not approach the defendant rapidly, and made no demonstration of any kind. It was
held that the evidence of the threat
was inadmissible, as the fear of the
defendant was cowardly and not a
reasonable outcome of the deceased's conduct. See Wesley v.
State, 37 Miss., 327; Evans v. State,
44 liss., 762; Myers v. State, 3o
Tex., 527; Pritchett v. State, 22
Ala., 39.
Where there is no direct evidence
of whether the deceased or the defendant was the assailant, no eye
witnesses to the encounter, but it
is known that both principals participated, it is often well-nigh impossible to solve the question
without resorting to facts and circumstances antecedent to the encounter to show the animus of the
one to the other.
Take the class of cases of which
Wiggins v. People, 93 U. S., is the
type. A justifies the murder of B
upon the ground that B fired the
4lrst shot, and he killed him in selfdefense. At the encounter four
shots were knowa to have been
fired, of which three came from the
defendant's weapon. Upon arrest
two revolvers are found upon the
accused, one with three, and the
other with one of the chambers
emptied. It is in evidence that one
of these revolvers belonged to the
deceased and was picked up by A
immediately after the shooting.
The question was, whether A or B
fired the first dhot? The Supreme
Court said, in revL.sing the ruling
of the trial judge, who had rejected the evidence of threats (un-

communicated) made by the dcceased:
"Now, when, under the circumstances, the witness, and the only
witness who was present at the encounter, swears that he cannot tell
where the first shot came from,
though he knows the defendant
only fired three, it must be very
apparent that if the person to whom
the deceased exhibited that pistol a
few minutes before the shooting
had been permitted to tell the jury
that deceased then said, 'he wouid
kill the defendant before he went
to bed that night,' it would have
tended strongly to show where that
first shot came from, and how that
pistol with one chamber emptied
came to be found on the ground."
See, also, Patillo v.State (Tex.), 3
S. W. Rep., 766.
This brings us to the third head
of the classification adopted at the
beginning of this article:
(3) .Doesit matter that thethreats
ofthe deceasedare uncommunicated
to the defendant ? It has been seen
thatproof of threats made by the deceased and brought to the knowledge of the accused may be received as tending to show the evidence
of a belief in the mind of the accused that his life was in danger, or
that he had reason to apprehend
some great bodily harm from the
acts and motions of the deceased,
when in the absence of such threats,
such acts and motions would cause
no belief. In the leading case of
Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y., 154, the
question was whether Jim Fisk was
aggressor in the encounter between
the latter and Stokes. Evidence of
threats made by risk "that he
would first beggar Stokes and then
kill him" was refus :d by the trial
judge because the3 had not been
broug~ht to the knowledge of the
defendant. The Court of Appeals,
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through GROVER, J., declared that.
the evidenceought to have been admitted.
"We thinl," said-the
Court, "that an attempt to execute
threats is equally probable when not
communicated to the party threatened as when they are so; and
when, as in this case, the question
is- whether an attempt was made,
we can see no reason for excluding
them in the former that would not
be equally cogent for exclusion of
the latter; the latter being admissible only for the reason that the
person threatened would the more
readily believe himsdlf endangered..
by the probability of an attempt to
execute such threats ....
The
difference is only in degree." See
Keener v. State, 18 Ga., 194; Pulchette v. State, 22 Ala., 39; Campbell, v. People, x6 Ill., 17.
In Wiggins v. People (sufira), it
is evident that for the purposes for
- "which the eidence was offered, it
was perfectly immaterial whether
•. the threats had been brought to the
knowledge of the defendant or not.
It was not to justify the act of the
defendant upon the theory that the
deceased acted at the encounter in
such a manner as to create the belief that he was to execute his
threats, but to prove that the cause
of the defendant's shooting was the
deceaged's first shot.
The, authorities by no means
agree as to when the uncommunicated threats of the deceased are
admissible. Some of the cases proceed upon the theory that inasmuch
as the prior declarations of the defendant are admissible to show that
in killing he was executing a preconceived intention, the defendant
is entitled to show that the deceased
made threats which he attempted
to execute when the defendant anticipated him: Burns v. State, 49

Ala., 370; Roberts v. State, 68 Ala.,
156; Hor. and Thomp. Cas. on SelfDefense; Campbell v. Ill., 16 Ill.,
17; People v. Taing, 53 Cal., 6o2.
Again, the animus of the defendanttoward the deceased may always
be shown to prove motive, etc.;
why should not the defendant be
allowed to prove the feeling of the
deceased toward him? In Keener
v. Georgia,' 18 Ga., 194, the Court
asked: "Ought not this conversation, whether communicated to
Keener or not, have been admitted
as a substantive fact or not, to show
'the malus animus or evil intent toward Keener with which Reese
went to'the house that night? Laying aside all technical rules and
reasoning, -weask,, withthe knowledge of the mind and feelings of
the deceased disclosed by this witness, would we not, and ought not
the jury to .listen more indulgently
to the alleged apprehension of injury, on the part of Keener, as well
as the facts and circumstances upon
which he relies to justify his conduct? .... ..
Do not these facts
serve to illustrate the transaction ?"
Keener v. Ga., 18 Ga., 194.
The evidence of the uncommnnicated threats is inadmissible to
show the evil intent of the deceased
toward the defendant, because it is
immaterial, as a principle of substantive law, what the animus of
the deceased may have been. In
any event, the hatred of an enemy
never justilfes his murder. See
Edwards v. State, 55 Miss., 424;
Kenrick v. State, 55 Miss., 436;
Statev. Malloy, 44 Iowa, 1O4; Morgan v. Coin., 14 Bush., io6; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St., 146.
It seems, then, that when an encounter occurs between two persons, one of whom is killed and
the witnesses of the difficulty dif-

